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We report an experiment where we examine whether an unexpected stimulus change 
that occurs whilst performing an engaging task is more likely to be noticed if it is 
relevant or irrelevant to the goal of that task. The goal was to count the number of times 
moving targets (white letters) hit the side of the frame on a computer screen but to 
ignore similarly moving distractors (black letters). We found that a highly goal-relevant 
change (i.e., a black distractor changing into a white target) was more likely to be noticed 
than a less-relevant change (a white target turning into a black distractor). However, 
people with high working memory were more likely to notice the goal-relevant change 
but less likely to notice the goal-irrelevant change. High working memory capacity 
appears to be associated with the more efficient strategy, which is to notice the change 
when it is goal-relevant but to inhibit it when it is not relevant to prevent the possibility 
of interference with the goal of the primary task. We then investigated whether previous 
exposure to an unexpected change influenced the likelihood that a different change (an 
unexpected red cross in a standard dynamic inattentional blindness task) would be 
noticed. We observed prior experience of a change reduced the incidence of Inattentional 
Blindness. These findings are discussed in terms of dual-route model of Inattentional 
blindness, in which the failure to notice the unexpected stimulus can result from a lack of 
processing or from inhibition. 
 
KEYWORDS: Inattentional Blindness, Change Blindness, Working Memory Capacity, 
Awareness, Dual-Route Model. 
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Tales of the unexpected: goal-relevance and prior exposure to an unexpected change and 
attentional awareness 
Failures of attention are commonplace in everyday life. One such example of this is 
inattentional blindness (IB), which occurs when we fail to notice an unexpected stimulus 
when we are engaged in a resource-consuming task (Mack & Rock, 1998). This type of 
attention failure has been responsible for some tragedies, such as the incident of the 
flight crew who, when distracted by a flashing light, failed to notice their plane 
approaching the runway too early and fast, resulting in the plane crashing and killing 
over 100 people (Green, 2005).  The standard laboratory-based dynamic inattentional 
blindness paradigm that is used to examine this phenomenon involves participants 
counting the number of times white moving letters (targets) bounce off the screen frame 
while ignoring similarly moving black letters (distractors) – this is the tracking task. 
After a few seconds, an unexpected red cross appears at the side of the screen, moves 
across the centre and disappears several seconds later at the other side. Participants 
report the number of target bounces and are then asked if they saw anything else. Those 
failing to report the red cross are deemed ‘IB’ whereas those reporting its presence are 
‘NIB’ (not-IB).  
Much research has shown that IB levels are affected by the physical display 
(Cartwright-Finch, & Lavie, 2007; Jensen, Yao, Street & Simons, 2011; Koivisto, & 
Revonsuo, 2008; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005) but little research has been 
conducted on why some individuals in an identical situation are IB whereas others are 
not. We found no differences between those who were and were not inattentionally blind 
in processing style or ability to inhibit irrelevant stimuli (Hannon & Richards, 2010; 
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Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010), although some recent research has identified 
difference in saliency detection that are associated with IB status (Papera, Cooper, & 
Richards, 2014). Hannon and Richards (2010) found that although visual working 
memory did predict inattentional blindness when it was entered into the analysis on its 
own, when a more central executive measure of working memory capacity was entered 
into the analysis, only central executive resources predicted inattentional blindness and 
visual working memory was no longer a significant predictor. Likewise, in a study where 
we examined the personality trait, absorption (Tellergen Absorption Scale, TAS; Tellegen 
& Atkinson, 1974), it was found that this trait predicted inattentional blindness but fell 
out of the equation when working memory capacity scores were entered. People with 
high working memory capacity were more likely to notice the unexpected stimulus 
compared to those with low capacity  (Richards, Gunnarsson Hellgren, & French, 2014).  
We call this the limited-resources hypothesis, where inattentional blindness is associated 
with reduced working memory capacity (WMC; Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards, 
Gunnarsson Hellgren, & French, 2014; Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010; Richards, 
Hannon, & Vitkovitch, 2012; Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer, 2011; Todd, Fougnie, & 
Marois, 2005; but see Bredemeier & Simons, 2012). Beanland and Pammer (2012) found 
a correlation between IB and the size of the attentional blink, suggesting there are 
individual differences in failures of conscious visual awareness across a variety of tasks.  
One problem with the standard IB task is that the status of the red cross is 
ambiguous. It is not part of any task instructions and is therefore irrelevant to the 
primary task – which is to count the number of target bounces. However, because 
participants are not told anything about the red cross at the beginning of the experiment, 
Tales of the Unexpected 
 
5 
they may assume that it has some relevance and therefore remember its occurrence. It is 
therefore unclear whether the most efficient and effective strategy is to process the 
unexpected stimulus in case it is relevant so that it is available to conscious awareness or 
whether, given its probable irrelevance, it is more efficient to inhibit it. Inattentional 
blindness has been shown to occur in people performing a task in which they have a high 
level of expertise. Drew, Võ and Wolfe (2013) asked a group of expert radiologists to 
examine a series of computer-tomographic axial lung slices for lung nodules, and found 
83% of them failed to notice the unexpected gorilla that was embedded in the last case in 
the series. In this task, the presence of the gorilla is irrelevant to the goal of the task (i.e., 
to detect lung abnormalities) and arguably the most efficient strategy would be to inhibit 
it, and expert radiologists are more able to inhibit this unexpected and irrelevant 
stimulus. 
 A related failure of conscious awareness is change blindness (CB), which occurs 
when a change in a scene goes unnoticed (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997). Change 
blindness can occur when the change is not expected such as in the example provided by 
Simons and Levin (1998) in which a participant’s conversation with a stranger was 
interrupted by a large object coming between them obscuring each person’s view of the 
other. During this interruption, a different person replaced the stranger and many 
participants failed to notice that they were speaking to a different individual after the 
interruption compared to before. Change blindness can occur even when participants are 
aware that there is a change occurring, such as in an oscillating change in a flicker task 
(e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Hyun, Woodman, Vogel, Hollingworth, & Luck, 2009; Simons, 
1996).  Change blindness  and inattentional blindness are similar in that they both 
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involve visual awareness failures (Jensen, Yao, Street, & Simons, 2011) but they come 
from different theoretical and empirical backgrounds. McCarley, Vais, Pringle, Kramer, 
Irwin and Strayer (2004) found that having fewer available mental resources increased 
the incidence of change blindness. This is consistent with our research where 
inattentional blindness was associated with executive function but not visual memory 
(e.g., Hannon & Richards, 2010). The one-scene change blindness research is similar to 
inattentional blindness research, but the change that occurs in the former is directly 
relevant to the goal of the task (e.g., having a conversation with a stranger) whereas the 
change in inattentional blindness research is not directly relevant to the task (e.g., a red 
cross traversing the screen when counting moving letters).  
Here we use a novel task, based on the one-scene change change blindness task 
where a single change occurs during a dynamic tracking task. In our task, the change 
occurs within the task such that the unexpected stimulus is either relevant or irrelevant 
to the primary task of target tracking. It could be argued that a relevant change should be 
noticed if it is directly related to the goal but inhibited if not relevant and might therefore 
cause interference. In the current experiment, we have two conditions: one where the 
change is goal-relevant and a distractor transforms into a target (distractor-to-target) 
and a second condition that is comparatively goal-irrelevant, where a target changes into 
a distractor (target-to-distractor). The task-relevance hypothesis predicts that the 
unexpected change is more likely to be reported if that change is goal-relevant rather 
than goal-irrelevant. Although both changes are important, it is more efficient to 
suppress the processing of the target-to-distractor event, as this change renders the 
stimulus irrelevant in the display whereas it is important to use resources on the 
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distractor-to-target stimulus, as this change is important and relevant to the primary 
task of counting white targets.  
The task-relevance hypothesis would therefore predict noticing levels to be higher 
for the relevant than for the irrelevant change condition.  The relevant change condition 
results in an increase in task difficulty, as there are more targets to track compared to 
the irrelevant change condition (5 targets vs. 3 targets respectively). On the basis of our 
previous research, however, we have consistently observed increases in the incidence of 
inattentional blindness when task difficulty increases. We call this the limited-resources 
hypothesis because failure to notice the change occurs as a result of reduced capacity. 
Following on  from this, people with lower working memory therefore would be less 
likely to notice the unexpected stimulus than those with higher working memory. The 
task-relevance hypothesis and the limited-resources hypothesis therefore make 
opposing predictions, with the former predicting higher incidence of awareness of the 
change when it is relevant whereas the latter predicts that awareness rates will be lower 
for the relevant condition because it is a more difficult task and requires more resources. 
In a subsequent task, we examine whether prior exposure to a change in a tracking 
task influences performance on a standard inattentional blindness task. Gaspar, Neider, 
Simons, McCarley and Kramer (2013) observed improved change detection performance 
in participants who were trained on the task compared to those who were not, but this 
training effect did not generalize to a new change detection task. We previously 
demonstrated that primary-task practice (with no changes occurring) significantly 
reduces the incidence of IB on a subsequent IB task (Richards et al., 2010). Therefore, to 
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rule out practice effects per se, our control condition required participants to perform 
(practice) the primary task before the standard-IB task. 
 In sum, we investigate whether goal-relevant changes are more noticeable than 
less relevant ones, and whether prior exposure to a change influence later noticing of the 
unexpected stimulus on a standard inattentional task. 
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-four participants were recruited but those with accuracy scores on the 
tracking tasks at 70% and below were excluded from the main analyses (21 participants 
were excluded). It is important that participants perform the tracking task to a minimum 
standard, as participants need to be engaged in a resource-consuming task. There were 
therefore 63 participants (mean age of 32.32 (SD = 9.37); 38 males) in the final sample.  
The number of exclusions, age and sex ratio did not differ between the conditions. 
Materials 
Automated Operation Span task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) to measure 
WMC. Participants completed a series of simple maths problems. A letter was presented 
after each problem and retained in memory until the end of the trial. At the end of each 
trial (varying between 3 maths problems/3 letters to 7 maths problems/7 letters) a 
letter matrix appeared and the participant clicked the letters in the exact order in which 
they appeared in the trial. Each maths problem had to be solved within a time limit 
(determined during the preceding practice). Scores range between 0 and 75. 
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The three videos (Change videos; see Figure 1) were created using MatLab, and were 
similar to that of Most, Scholl, Clifford and Simons (2005; see Simons, 2003). The 
primary task comprised four white (two Ls and two Ts) and four black letters (two Ls 
and two Ts) moving around the screen, hitting the borders of the display. Participants 
were required to silently count the number of white letters hitting the border of the 
picture frame but ignore the black letters. Each video lasted for 31 s. Each began with a 
6 s still frame after which the letters moved around the screen linearly for 25 s. After 16 
s (from the very beginning of the video), one letter in the two training conditions 
changed colour. In the Target-to-Distractor condition a white L (a target) hit the frame 
on two occasions and then changed into a black L (a distractor) whereas in the 
Distractor-to-Target condition a black L (a distractor) turned into a white L (a target). 
There was no change in the control condition. There were 20, 27 and 24 hits in the 
target-to-distractor, distractor-to-target, and control conditions, respectively. The 
target-to-distractor and the distractor-to-target videos both involved a change that 
occurred to one of the stimuli on the screen during the video. Before participants in 
these two conditions were presented with the final, standard inattentional blindness 
video, they had either noticed the change when questioned or they were made aware of 
the change by the experimenter. These two videos exposed participants to an 
unexpected change occurring in the tracking task. Participants in the control video were 
not exposed to any such changes and therefore their participation served as a control 
condition.   












































Figure 1.  Sample video stills: A. Relevant change where a distractor (black L) changes into a 
target (white L). B. Irrelevant change where a target (white L) changes into a distractor (black 
L).  C. Control (no change). Left panel = start configuration with letter that will change circled. 
Right panel = post-change configuration with change circled with broken line.  




A video (standard-IB) of the same duration and format was created but with no changes 
to targets or distractors. After 12s an unexpected red cross appeared at the right-hand 
side of the frame, traversed the centre for 11secs exiting at the left-hand side of the 
frame (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Standard dynamic inattentional blindness in which the unexpected stimulus (the red 
cross) appears at the right hand frame and then travels across the screen in a straight line, 
disappearing on the left hand frame 11 s later. 
 
                                          
Recognition Task. A 16-object array (cross, triangle, circle and diamond, in red, green, 
yellow and blue) was presented to all IB participants. 
Full Attention Trial. To check that participants saw the red cross when not engaged in 
any additional task, they simply viewed the video again. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the Automated Operation Span Task and were then randomly 
assigned to the relevant (distractor-to-target), irrelevant (target-to-distractor) or control 
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condition. The task was to monitor how many times the white letters hit the frame but to 
ignore the black letters. At the end, participants reported the number of hits. In the prior 
exposure conditions where there was either a change to a target or a change to a 
distractor, participants were asked if anything unexpected had happened during the 
video. If participants noticed the colour change of one of the letters, they were recorded 
as being aware and the remaining participants as being unaware. The participants in the 
control condition were simply asked to report the number of target hits during the video 
(there were no changes here). All participants watched the video again but those in the 
two change-exposure conditions were made aware of the change to one of the letters 
during the video.  
All participants then performed the standard dynamic inattentional blindness 
task by counting the number of times the white letters hit the frame while ignoring the 
black letters. At the end, they were asked how many hits they counted and then asked if 
they noticed anything unexpected. Participants were recorded as being ‘non-
inattentionally blind’ if they noticed the red cross but ’inattentionally blind’ if they had 
not. The recognition task was administered and inattentionally blind individuals were 
asked to try to identify/guess the identity of the unexpected stimulus (none were 
successful). Finally, the standard-inattentional blindness video was shown for a second 
time but without task requirements. All participants spontaneously reported the 
appearance of the red cross. 
 
 




Relevance of Change. Participants were more aware of the change when the change was 
irrelevant to the task (i.e., target-to-distractor) than when it was relevant (distractor-to-
target; 2 = 4.58, N=42, p=.03,  = .33; see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants who were aware of the change when it was 
irrelevant (when a target changed into a distractor) and relevant (when a distractor 
changed into a target) to the tracking task of counting the number of time targets (white 
letters) hit the frame of the display.  
 
This supports the limited-resources hypothesis rather than the relevance 
hypothesis, as a relevant change required more tracking than an irrelevant one (5 targets 
rather then 3) and the incidence of awareness of the change was higher for the easier 
task. However, an examination of AOSPAN scores (which measured working memory 
capacity), with awareness status (aware, unaware) and task-relevance (relevant, 
irrelevant) as between-subjects factors revealed an interaction between task-relevance 
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and awareness (F(1,38) = 4.37, p = .043, p2 = .10; See Figure 4).  Those participants who 
were aware of the change in the relevant condition had higher Automated Operation 
Span scores than those who were aware in the irrelevant condition (t(16) = 2.34, p=.03,  
mean difference = 13.8, CI95 = 1.3, 26.2). The opposite pattern was found for participants 
who were not change aware, but this was non-significant (t(22) = -1.05, p =.3, mean 
difference = -8.5, CI95 = -25.2, 8.2).  
 
 
Figure 4. Mean AOSPAN scores for change unaware and change aware participants in the 
relevant and irrelevant conditions. 
 
 
Across both tasks, there were no differences in performance of the tracking task (i.e., 
counting the number of target hits) suggesting that all participants performed the 
tracking task to a similar standard (Fs<1).   
Awareness of the unexpected stimulus in the standard  inattentional blindness 
task was increased in those participants who had had prior exposure to a change 
compared to those in the control condition (2 = 6.08, N=63, p=.009,  = .33).  





More people detected the change in the video when the task was easy (4 targets reduced 
to 3) and relatively goal-irrelevant than when it was difficult (4 targets increased to 5) 
and goal-relevant. This finding supports the idea that when the task is easier (and less 
resource-consuming) the change is more easily spotted than when it is difficult. On the 
surface this does not offer support for the idea that when a change is goal-relevant, it is 
more likely to be seen than if it is relatively goal-irrelevant. However, the working 
memory capacity data (as measured by the AOSPAN) reveal that for those participants 
with high working memory capacity, the nature of the change is important. Given the 
overall task, when the change is highly relevant to the goal then the most efficient 
strategy is to process it fully, and should be noticed. When this change is relatively goal-
irrelevant, then a better strategy would be to inhibit it and, as a result, not notice it. The 
working memory capacity data support this idea, as higher working memory capacity 
was associated with using the better strategy in both instances. Participants with higher 
working memory capacity noticed the change when it was goal-relevant but failed to 
notice the change when it was goal-irrelevant. These findings support previous research 
that high working memory capacity is associated with greater flexibility in attentional 
allocation (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003). The evidence showing 
that working memory resources are required for effective inhibition of information (e.g., 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Conway & Engle, 1994; Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 
1999) supports the idea that participants do not report the change in the goal-irrelevant 
condition precisely because it is relatively goal-irrelevant and therefore inhibited (see 
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also Drew, Võ & Wolfe, 2013). These data also support Vogel, McCollough and 
Machizawa (2005) in that the more efficient strategy was associated with higher 
working memory capacity than the less efficient strategy.  
The data from this experiment support the dual-route model of inattentional 
blindness, which suggests that there are different ways in which inattentional blindness 
can occur. Whether IB occurs or not is largely determined by the physical environment, 
but individual differences must play a part given that in the exact same physical 
environment, some people will be IB whereas others will not. The dual route model 
predicts that low working memory capacity individuals will not process the unexpected 
stimulus because they have insufficient resources whereas the high working memory 
capacity individuals will fully process the unexpected stimulus (because they do have 
sufficient resources) but this will result in the unexpected stimulus being processed to 
full awareness (if the unexpected change is relevant to the goal of the task) or inhibited 
(if the unexpected change is not relevant to the goal of the task).   
 Being exposed to a change (relevant or irrelevant) resulted in participants being 
more likely to notice the unexpected stimulus (red cross) appearing in a standard 
inattentional blindness task in comparison with the control group (who were exposed to 
the same tracking task as those in the relevant/irrelevant conditions but without any 
change occurring during the task). This suggests that participants exposed to, and made 
aware of, an unexpected change subsequently altered their goals and invested more 
resources in the task making the red cross more likely to be detected. Participants 
previously exposed to a change appeared to be better able to use their resources flexibly 
by changing their attentional set (Folk, Remington, & Johnson, 1992). Prior exposure 
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may also have led to a degree of automatisation, thus freeing up resources even for those 
with lower working memory capacity. It is likely that those individuals with lower 
working memory resources will fail to detect unexpected changes irrespective of 
whether they are relevant or irrelevant simply because working memory resources are 
fully consumed by the main task and there are not sufficient resources left to fully 
process the unexpected stimulus. This is because processing a stimulus to awareness 
requires cognitive resources but inhibiting a stimulus also requires resources. When 
cognitive resources are low, we propose that the unexpected stimulus irrespective of its 
relevancy to the task will not be fully processed, rather it will be filtered out at an early 
stage. 
 The failure of any inattentionally blind individual to correctly identify the red 
cross in the recognition task argues against the idea of inattentional amnesia. However, a 
caveat here is that the standard inattentional blindness task does not have an explicit 
learning component, and therefore a more implicit memory task may have elicited some 
memory representation in those participants who were not consciously aware of the red 
cross (Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993).  
In sum, whether someone is consciously aware of a change in a task depends on the 
nature of that task (whether the unexpected change is relevant or irrelevant to the goal 
of the primary task) and their working memory resources. A relevant change requires 
resources to detect it but an irrelevant change requires resources to inhibit it. These data 
support the dual-route model, which proposes that inattentional blindness can result 
from either the unexpected stimulus not being fully processed due to a lack of cognitive 
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resources or from the unexpected stimulus being fully processed and then inhibited 
because it is not relevant to the goal of the task. 
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